Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.
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Classical and Contemporary ReadingsD. As a satisficing approximation, [ 16 ] the transmission of warrant generally occurs iff:. The difference between transmission and warrant closure is best seen in cases of question begging.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Epistemology of Memory in Philosophy of Mind. Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World. So in particular, in the context of the reductio, W. Tom Stoneham – – Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 1: Other relevant collections include: Science Logic and Contwnt.
For it seems that II can be shown true, no matter whether the skeptic speaks English boghhossian Twin English. The issue is that EXT seemingly implies that knowing about content requires knowing about the environment.
Content and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind
Whereas, 2 is apriori given SK. Boghssian a final thought, memory may ultimately be a red herring in defending incompatibilism. So if EXT on this first reading is true, 1 is apriori and nothing here prejudges what E is.
Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Request removal from index. In which case, the environmental difference creates a difference in form as well as content.
Yet there are actual examples which also illustrate the point Ludlow b; see also ButlerTye Alison Gopnik – cpntent Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 1: These arguments instead rest on various thought self-knoledge, purporting to show that internally identical subjects can host different thought contents, solely because of environmental differences Putnam ;McGinnStichBurge ; ; This parallels a natural view of perceptual judgment: The contents of memory thus might be an exception.
So if context makes that possibility relevant, one may lose the ability to self-know from the armchair. So when it comes to the reductio, the absurdity stems from thinking that 2 is apriori, since knowledge of 2 already rests on knowledge of 3.
An Externalist Account of Introspectve Knowledge. Related Entries introspection mental content: And since the latter self-knoaledge empirical, so too would be the former, contra SK.
Other Internet Resources Hofmann, F. Yet incompatibilists reply that the second reading cannot be what is really intended.
Request removal from index. The interested reader is encouraged to visit the entry on self-knowledge for more.
Paul Boghossian, Content and self-knowledge – PhilPapers
But is the tension real? Tyler Burge – – Journal of Philosophy 85 November: The counter-suggestion is that memory instead offers information about past events, in terms pertinent to the present environment Ludlow ;Bernecker That suggests that if Oscar has acquired the concept, 4 must be true.
The claim is that one interprets sensory input when attributing thoughts to oneself, just as in attributing thoughts to others.
Where t 2 is a time after a slow switch, and t 1 is a time before, then:. Regardless, it may be troubling enough if an externalist cannot actually have armchair self-knowledge Ludlow For instance, suppose after the switch that Oscar judges:. This is annd 3 is empirical and it is conceded that 2 presupposes 3 cf. Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. A final worry for W. So CW is satisfied in this self-knowlerge.